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Abstract 
In 1989, Eugenio Moggi proposed a categorical framework for program semantics based on 
the notion of a strong monad. He showed that various kinds of computation can be modeled in 
his framework. On the other hand, strong monads are not suited for the categorical semantics 
of traditional modal logics. According to these observations, Moggi thought that the Curry- 
Howard correspondence would not hold between programs and constructive proofs in modal 
logics. However, contrary to his view, we can show that proofs in a certain kind of modal 
logics are actually considered as programs. In this paper, first we shall introduce the notion 
of an Y-strong monad which is a generalization of strong monads. Using this new notion, 
we can generalize Moggi’s semantics-preserving soundness and completeness with respect to 
his equational logic. Next we shall show that Y-strong monads give a sound and complete 
semantics of a constructive version of S4 modal logic. Finally, we present a method to extract a 
monad-based imperative functional program from a proof in the modal logic. Interestingly, this 
method can also be understood in terms of Y-strong monads. 
1. Introduction 
In 1989, Eugenio Moggi proposed a categorical framework for program semantics 
based on the notion of a strong monad. His framework is so general that it can treat 
various kinds of computation such as non-terminating evaluation, non-deterministic 
computation, side-effects, exceptions, continuation passing, I/O, etc. Today, monad- 
based imperative fUnctiona programming is extensively studied. 
It is known that monads can be used to interpret logical modalities such as possibility 
in modal logic or ‘why not’ of linear logic. Comonads, the dual of monads, are used to 
model necessity or ‘of course’ modality. However, strong monads are not suitable for 
modeling modalities. The reason is that if we interpret modalities in a strong monad, 
then some unnatural formulas such as A A o B -+ o (A A B) become valid. In this sense, 
strong monads are too strong. However, simple monads are too weak as the basis of 
program semantics. According to these observations, Moggi thought that the Curry- 
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Howard correspondence would not hold between programs and constructive proofs in 
modal logics. If it is correct, the formal program derivation techniques based on the 
proofs-as-programs principle will not be generalized to derive monad-based imperative 
programs. 
However, fortunately, the fact is contrary to his conjecture. We can show that proofs 
in a certain kind of modal logics are actually considered as programs. 
In this paper, we introduce the notion of an Z-strong monad as a generalization of 
a strong monad. This new notion gives a semantical framework suitable for both pro- 
grams and modal logics. We can generalize Moggi’s semantics-preserving soundness 
and completeness with respect to his equational logic. Moreover, Z-strong monads give 
a sound and complete semantics of a constructive version of S4 modal logic called 
CS4. We shall also present a type theory TCS4 which is a term assignment system 
for CS4. TCS4 is considered as an extension of the type system of Moggi’s computa- 
tional metalanguage. We define a collapsing map from TCS4 to an extended version of 
Moggi’s type system. It will offer a clear understanding of the relation between these 
two type systems. 
To establish the proofs-as-programs principle, we shall define a realizability inter- 
pretation of our modal logic. A realizer of a program specification formula is considered 
as a program which meet the specification. We can find such a realizer by collapsing 
a proof term of TCS4 using our collapsing map. This result gives an effective method 
to extract a monad-based imperative functional program written in the computational 
metalanguage from a proof in our modal logic. Interestingly, this method can also be 
understood in terms of P’-strong monads. 
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we shall review Moggi’s program 
semantics based on strong monads. In Section 3, we consider an extension of the com- 
putational metalanguage, which will be used later to define a realizability interpretation 
of our modal logic. Then we shall discuss the incompatibility of strong monads with 
traditional modal logics in Section 4. In Section 5, we introduce the notion of an 
Y-strong monad, and using it we generalize Moggi’s semantics. We prove soundness 
and completeness for our new semantics. In Section 6, we shall present a construc- 
tive version of S4 modal logic called CS4 and its type theoretical counterpart TCS4. 
We show that Z’-strong monad gives a complete semantics of CS4 and TCS4. We 
define a collapsing map from TCS4 to the extended metalanguage. In Section 7, we 
define a realizability interpretation of CS4 and prove its soundness. Using this result, 
we show that proofs in CS4 (or TCS4) can be considered as programs. Further, we 
prove that the realizability interpretation is a special case of the categorical interpreta- 
tion of our modal logic. Finally, we shall give a toy example of program extraction in 
Section 8. 
In this manuscript, we assume that the reader has basic knowledge of: Cartesian 
closed categories (ccc’s), (strong) monads, comonads, intuitionistic and modal logics, 
realizability interpretations and constructive type theories. The reader unfamiliar with 
ccc’s, monads or comonads is referred to MacLane’s textbook [5]. For strong monads, 
see [6] or [7]. For intuitionistic logics, realizability interpretations and constructive type 
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theories, see [lo]; a simple example of collapsing map is also found in Vol. II of this 
book. Goldblatt’s book [3] will be convenient for computer scientists as an introduction 
to modal logics. 
2. Review of Moggi’s semantics 
The central idea of Moggi’s program semantics is that we distinguish the object A 
of values of type A from the object MA of computations of type A, where A and B are 
the semantical domains corresponding to A and B respectively. An “impure” function 
S from A to B is modeled by a morphism from A to MB. Intuitively, an element c( of 
MA is a computation which may produce a value in A as the resulting value; cz itself 
is not a value in A. LX and its resulting value are not identified. M is called a notion 
of computation. 
An important discovery of Moggi is that, in many interesting cases, M and the 
associated operations form a strong monad structure. Moggi found a general framework 
of program semantics based on the notion of a strong monad. 
In what follows, we write f; g for the composition of two arrows f : A -+ B and 
g : B + C, i.e. f ;g means g o f. It is well known that monads and Kleisli triples are 
in one-to-one correspondence. When a monad (A$ q, p) is given, we write f * for the 
Kleisli lifting of f in the sense of the corresponding Kleisli category. 
Side-efict monads: A side-effect monad is a typical example of strong monad. Here 
we discuss non-deterministic ones and deterministic ones. They will be important in 
later sections. 
A non-deterministic side effect monad (M, q, ,u, t) over Set (the category of sets) is 
defined as follows: Let S be the set of states; then define 
M(-) = qs x (- x S)), 
(s,(a’,s’))EqA(a)*aa’=aAs’=s, 
(s, (C”,s”)) E /Q(c) * 3c’.3s’.(s, (c’,s’)) E c A (s’, (C”,s”)) E c’, 
(s, (a’,s’)) E tA,B(a, b) ++ 3b’.((s, (b’,s’)) E b A a’ = (a, b’)), 
where 9 is the covariant power set functor. Then we have 
Y]~:A-+MA, 
tA,B:A x MB +M(A x B). 
The intuitive meaning of (s, (a’,~‘)) E a is that the evaluation of a that is started at 
the state s can terminate at the state s’ and return a’ as the resulting value. The compu- 
tation of VA(u) immediately returns a and does not change the state. The computation 
of PA(a) is done as follows: first a is computed; if it returns a value a’, then a’ is 
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computed; and if a’ returns a”, then CZ” is returned as the resulting value of P.,,(Q). To 
compute ~(a, b), first compute b and receive a resulting value b’, then return (a, b’) 
as the resulting value of the whole computation. 
The deterministic version of the side-effect monad can be defined on any ccc. For 
example, take %? = CPO (the category of complete partial orders). Let S be an object. 
Define 
Iv-) = (S =+ (- x S)), 
tA,B = ~(~A,S&~S,S; (idA x edT,EkS); aj$$> 
= A(a,f) :A x MB.J..s:X(let (b,s’) = fs in ((a,b),s’)), 
where A is the currying operation and eval is the evaluation map; A-means the informal 
lambda abstraction; a is a natural isomorphism 
aA,B,C: (A x B) X c + A X (B X c). 
For other examples of strong monads such as the monad of partiality or the monad 
of continuations, see [6] or [7]. Some practical applications of monads are found 
in [ll, 121. 
2.1. Computational metalanguage 
In [7], Moggi proposed a formal language called computational metalanguage (the 
metalanguage, for short). The approach taken in [7] is as follows: first he establishes 
a clear categorical semantics of the metalanguage, and then describe the semantics of 
other languages in terms of the metalanguage. 
Types: Assume that the set of basic types is given. Then the types of the language 
are defined by the following rules: 
~ A type(A is a basic type) 
t 71 type I- r2 type 
t 1 type t 71 x ~2 type 
Terms: Suppose that the set of function symbols is given and each function symbol 
has its arity of the form ri + 22, where zi and 72 are types. Then terms are defined 
by the following rules: 
t ri type (l<i<n) 
x1 .Tl,..., X, 1 T, t Xj 1 Ti rk*:l 
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rkel:zl rte2:~2 Tke:zl xz2 
r k (el,e2) : 71 x ~2 r t- 7Ci(f?) : Zi 
33 
r t el : zl 
(f is a function symbol of arity ~1 -+ 3) 
rte:z 
r k f(el ) : 72 r 1 [e] : MT 
r t el :Mz, r,x:zl t e2:M2 
r k (let xl + el in e2):Mq 
where r E x1 : 71,. . . ,x, : z, is a typing context; x1,. . . ,x, are variables, and ~1,. . . , zn 
are types. 
Intuitively, [a] : MA is a : A viewed as a computation, and the execution of (let x1 -k 
el in e2) is done as follows: first execute el and bind x1 to the resulting value VI ; then 
execute e2 in this new binding environment and receive the resulting value ~2; finally, 
return v2 as the resulting value of the whole execution. 
2.2. Semantics 
Semantics of types: The interpretation of types is given by 0 = (%,(M,q,p, t),e), 
where V is a Cartesian category, (M,q,p, t) is a strong monad over V, and 6’ is a 
map from the set of basic types to Obj(%?). We define [zE1, the semantics of a type z 
under 0. For simplicity, we usually write i[zj for [rJ,$. It is defined by the following 
inductive definition: 
[IA]I = 19(,4) (A is a basic type), [Mzj = M[z]l, 811 = 1, [ZI x zz]l = 1[~11 x [22]1. 
For a context r = x1 : 71 , . . . ,x, : z,, we define I[rg = [zl] x . . . x [zn]. 
Semantics of terms: For a term e for which r t e : z is derivable, its interpretation 
[r E e: z] is defined as a morphism from [r] to [z]. 
First, we choose a map cp which maps each function symbol f of arity ~1 + 72 to 
a morphism cp( f) from [[zl] to [z2J Then [r k e : zfml is defmed by induction on the 
derivation of r t e : z, where I is the pair (0, cp). We usually abbreviate [ir k e : zfml 
as p- I- e : q. 
Variables, *, pairing and projections are interpreted as usual. Function call r k 
f (el ) : 52 (f : zl + TV) is interpreted by [r t- el : zl]; q(f ). [Ir k [e] :Mz] is defined as 
ur k e : 71; rurl. 
Interpretation of let-expressions is the key point of Moggi’s semantics. Suppose 
ur k el : ml] = gl : urn + kfplj, 
ur,xl : zl t e2 : ii4z2j = g2 : urn x u2ln + Mp2]i. 
At first sight, the definition 
ur t- (let xl -+ el in e2) : MT21 = (i+, 91); gT : i[rj -+ kfp2j 
seems to work. However, we cannot compose (id,,-,, gl) and gz, since the codomain 
of (idl,-,,gl) is [r]l x M[Iz,n, while the domain of gf is M([T]I x [zl]). Accordingly, 
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Table 1 
Summary of Moggi’s semantics 
Syntax Semantics 
rte:7* xz2 
r C zi(e) :zi 
f : ~1 - 52 (function symbol) 
r t el : 5, *Jg 
i- t f(el) : ~2 @ %cpu-1 
rke:z @,Y 
r k [e] : MT @ 9; qrp 
r E el : ml * 91 
r,xl : 7, k e2 : Mt2 w 92 
r k (letxi + el in e2):Mq w (idlrl,91);tgrl,u1,1;gT 
we need the tensorial strength here. Since tlr],lr,l is a morphism from [[rg x M[ziJ to 
M([T] x [ri]), we can compose (id,~,gi) and tlrl,IT,l;gz. Consequently, we define 
This semantics is summarized in Table 1. 
2.3. Formal system for equational reasoning 
Moggi [7] proposed a formal system for judging equality of terms. It has judgments 
of the form r k ei =T e2, whose intuitive meaning is that ei and e2 are equal as elements 
of r under the typing context r. The inference rules of his system are summarized in 
Table 2. We write [e/x]4 for the result of substitution of e for the free occurrences of 
x in 4. The interpretation of judgments is as follows: r k ei =T e2 is true (under I) 
if and only if [ir k ei : r&,, = [r t e2 : zf,, holds. Let E be an arbitrary set of equality 
judgments; then, by definition, I is a model of E if and only if every judgment in E 
is true under I. Moggi proved the following theorem: 
Theorem 2.1 (Moggi [7]). This formal system is sound and complete with respect o 
the semantics given in Section 2.2. 
Proof. See [7]. q 
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Table 2 
Equality rules for the metalanguage terms 
Inference rules of many sorted equational logic: 
refl r k e:5 r k el =r e2 
rkezre SW r C e2 =r el 
trans r t el =T e2 r t e2 =I e3 
r t el =r e3 
r t el =r, e2 
congr r t f(el) =72 f(4) 
subst rt--e:z r,x:zkd 
r t [e/xl4 
Rules for product types: 
XB 
i-t-eel:tl j-Fez:52 
X4 
rte:Tl X72 
r k d(el,e2)) =T~ e, r k (nl(e),nz(e)) =T,X12 e 
Rules for computational types: 
L-l.5 
r t- el =z e2 
let.5 
r k el =M~, ei r,x: Tl b e2 =Mr2 e.$ 
r k fell =M~ fe21 rt(letx+e, inez)=Mr,(letxe=e{ ine;) 
rl-eel:Msl r,x,:rl te2:M~2 r,x2:T2Eeg:Mz3 
ass r I- (let x2 + (let x1 * el in e2) in e3) ~~~~ (let x1 * el in (let x2 -+ 4 in e3)) 
M.B 
rke,:q r,x,:q ke2:Mf2 
M.V 
r k el : MSI 
i- k (let XI + fell in e2) =hfr2 felixlIe r F (let x1 * el in [xl]) =.m, el 
3. Extended metalanguage 
Here we introduce an extended version of the computational metalanguage which 
have function types rt -+ ~2, weak initial type 0 and weak coproduct types rt + ~2. 
We will need this version in Section 7 to define a realizability interpretation. 
First we add the following three new rules to the type-formation rules: (5) 0 is a type, 
(6-7) if rr and r2 are types, then rr + Q and rt --f r2 are types. Second we permit 
the language to have constant symbols. Recall that Moggi’s original metalanguage 
has function symbols instead of constant symbols. Each constant symbol has its type. 
Of course, each constant symbol c of type z can be replaced by a term f(*) using 
a function symbol fc of arity 1 + z. Conversely, f(e) (f a function symbol) can be 
replaced by an application term cfe using a constant cf, since we have function types 
now. In the following we assume, for simplicity, that we have no function symbols. 
Third we add the following new term-formation rules: 
r k c : r (c is a constant of type r) 
Tt-e:O l-z type TI-e:MO t--type 
r k?Z(e) : 7 r k?y(e) : z 
r,x : z1 k e : z2 r F e : z1 -+ z2 r I- el : z1 
rl-(kt:zl.e):21+r2 r k eel : 72 
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r k el : z1 I- z2 type 
r k inlr,,r2(el) : z1 + z2 
r k el : 72 k 71 type 
r I- inrT,,T2(e2) : z1 + 72 
rt-e:zl+r2 r,xl:zlt-c:z3 r,X2:Z2td:T3 
r k case e of inlz,,zz(xl) =S cIIinr,,,,,(x2) + d : z3 
Finally, we add the following rules to our formal system of equality judgments: 
app.t reel =T, e{ rl-e =T,+z2 e’ r,x : z1 F el =z2 e2 r keel =T2 e’e’, 1.t rk(h : z1 .el) =r,_+T2 (lx : 21.e2) 
rt-e:zl +z2 
+ .P 
r k el : z1 r,x : z1 t- e2 : z2 
r t- (Ax : 21.62)61 =T2 [el/x]e2 
in1.5 
r k el =r, ei k ~2 type 
r~inL,(el) =r,+rz inLn(e~) 
inr.C; 
r k e2 =T2 ek k q type 
r k inrr,,52(e2) =rl+72 inrr,,r2(ei) 
case. 4 
r k e =5,+52 e’ r,xl : Tl k c =T3 c’ r,x2 :z2 k d =5j d’ 
r k (case e of inlr,,r2(xl) + cllinrT,,Z2(x2) + d) 
=73 (case e’ of inlr,,r2(x1) + c’llinr,,,,,(x2) + d’) 
+.p.1 
r k el : z1 r,xl : z1 t- c : z3 r,x2 : z2 t- d : z3 
r k (case irkr2(el) of inlr,,&l) * cllinr,,,,,(x2) + d) =Tl [el/xl]c 
+.D.r 
r!-e2:T2 r,xl:71k~:73 r,x2:z2kd:Z3 
r k (case inrr,,r,(e2) of in.l,,,,,(xl) =+ cllinr,,,,,(x2) + d) =Tj [ez/xz]d 
where DV(T) is the set of variables declared in r. 
Semantics: Suppose that %? is Cartesian closed and weakly co-Cartesian, and let 
(M, q,p, t) be a strong monad over V. Further, we assume that the monad functor 
A4 preserves weak initials; i.e. if 0 is a weak initial, then MO is also a weak initial. 
We write ?A (?fh”, respectively) for a specified weak initial arrow from 0 to A (from 
MO to A, respectively). Since we may have constants, we must choose a map y which 
maps each constant symbol c of type z to a global element y(c) : 1 + [z]. The inter- 
pretation of a term is written as [r l- e : zl(~‘), rather than [r k e : &“,‘), because 
the interpretation cp of function symbols is now not necessary. Usually, we omit the 
superscript (0, y). Then the semantics of new types and terms are defined as shown 
in Table 3. 
Here we make some remarks on weak initials. The only weak initial object of Set is 
the empty set. The non-deterministic side effect monad over Set defined in Section 2 
does not preserve weak initials. However, the deterministic version over Set preserves 
weak initial. In CPO, every object is weakly initial, and hence any strong monad over 
CPO preserves weak initials. 
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Table 3 
Semantics of the extended metalanguage 
Semantics of types: 
[TI --t Q] = [rl] =k [72] (exponential object) 
[O] = 0 (weak initial object) 
1~1 + 54 = [rig + [q] (weak coproduct) 
Semantics of terms: 
Semantics 
(c is a constant of type 7) 
rt-c:r u ! II-]; Y(C) 
tstype 
Tte:O 
r t?r(e) : z 
t 5 type 
rl-e:MO 
r t?:(e): t 
k z2 type 
r k el : 71 
r t- id r,,T2(e,) 
tqtype 
r t e2 : 52 
r t inr,,,,,(e2) 
rte::,+f2 u 9 
r,x, : 5, t c : z3 * h 
r,X2:52kd:z3 * h2 
r t case of inlT,,T2(xl) =k cllinr,,,,, (x2) =t- d : ~3 u ((g; [A’hl, A’hz]), idrq); coal 
r,x : 7, t e : ~~ e 9 
rC(lx:r,.e):z, +r2 * 49 
rt-e:7, --tag * 9 
r t el : 5, * 91 
r t eel : z2 u (9.91); et& 
In the above, A’hl : (~11 - [rg + [q] is defined as A((q,nl); hl) (similarly for A’hz) 
4. Problems 
Moggi’s semantics was successful and his type system is well suited for imperative 
functional programs. Then a natural question arises: “Can it be considered as a logical 
framework? Many type systems such as CoC (calculus of constructions) or Girard’s F 
can naturally encode constructive logics. Then how about Moggi’s system?’ Actually, 
VA : A + MA looks like an inference rule “from A, infer VA,” and p~ : &A -+ MA 
looks like “from 02A, infer VA.” These two rules are derivable in S4 modal logic. Does 
Moggi’s type system correspond to any SClike natural modal logic? 
The answer is no. His computational metalanguage has, for each type A and B, a 
term A x MB t- e : M(A x B) corresponding to tensorial strength tA,~. This means that 
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an unnatural inference rule “from A A oB, infer o(A A B)” is valid in his type system. 
Here is an excerpt from Moggi [7]: 
. . .The semantics of computations corroborates the view that (constructive) proofs and 
programs are rather unrelated, although both of them can be understood in terms 
of fucntions. Indeed, monads (and comonads) used to model logical modalities, 
e.g., possibility and necessity in modal logic or why not and of course of linear 
logic, usually do not have a tensorial strength. In general, one should expect types 
suggested by logic to provide a more fine-grained type system without changing the 
nature of computations.. .  
However, there is a gap in this argument. The fact that his system is complete for 
strong monad semantics does not imply that strength is absolutely necessary to inter- 
pret his system. Instead, we can generalize his semantics preserving soundness and 
completeness, avoiding use of strong monads. Our new semantics described in the 
next section is based on the notion of Y-strong monad, in which tensorial strengths 
are replaced by what we call _Y-strengths. Unlike tensorial strengths, _Y-strengths cor- 
respond to the rule “from q A A oB, infer o(oA A B).” Fortunately, this rule is deriv- 
able in S4 modal logic. Moreover, Z-strong monads give sound and complete se- 
mantics of a constructive version of S4 modal logic called CS4 defined in Section 6. 
Since q and o are not inter-definable in intuitionistic logic, CS4 has both modali- 
ties as primitive operators. An Y-strong monad has a comonad structure to model 
o-modality. 
This result suggests that proofs and programs are closely related. In fact, we can 
show that proofs in our modal logic are considered as programs (see Section 7). 
Then another question arises: if a proof in our modal logic is a program and 
a comonad is needed to interpret o-modality, why comonad types were not needed 
in Moggi’s type system for programs? We shall answer this question in Section 9. 
5. Generalized semantics of the metalanguage 
In this section we generalize Moggi’s semantics using the notion of _Y’-strong monad. 
In the following, we write g A to mean the co-Kleisli lifting of g. When a comonad 
structure 2’ = (&&,a) over a category %? is given, we write f;L g for the composition 
of f and g in the co-Kleisli category wL induced by L?. 
5.1. P-strong monads 
Definition 5.1. A Cartesian comonad over a Cartesian category g is a comonad which 
preserves the Cartesian structure of V. In detail, it is a comonad equipped with an 
isomorphism ml : 1 + Ll and a natural isomorphism m : L(-) x L(-) + L(- x -) 
satisfying rn;,& = (L(Tc~~),L(YT$‘)) : L(.4 x B) + LA x LB. 
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An important fact is that the co-Kleisli category VTL induced by a cartesian comonad 
is also Cartesian. Its Cartesian structure is given as follows: 
produceAxLB=AxB, 
pairing (f,sjL = (.f,s), 
projection z,” = &A, x~~; Zi : L(,-~I X AZ) --) A,, 
terminal object 1 L = 1, 
terminal morphism !A” =!LA : LA -+ 1. 
NotethatfxLg=m;L;(f xg),where f :LA-+Candg:LB-+D. 
Moreover, if ‘%T is a ccc, VL is also a ccc. Its exponential structure is given as 
follows: 
exponential object A =sL B = LA + B, 
currying ALf = A(mA,B; f) : LA +B=+LC where f :L(AxB)-+C, 
evaluation eval 
L = (EB _.J c x L idLB); eval : L((B + L C) x L B) -+ C. 
Definition 5.2. Let (L, E, 6,m, ml) be a Cartesian comonad over %? and M be an endo- 
functor on $7. Consider the two functors H,K : +ZL x (e + V defined by the 
following: 
H(A, B) = LA x MB, K(A, B) = M(LA x B) for objects A,B, 
Htf, g> = f * x Mg, for morphisms f, g. 
An _5?-tensot-ial strength (S-strength for short) for M is, by definition, a natural trans- 
formation tL from H to K such that the following diagrmas commute: 
I 
L(AxB)xMC 
fA.8.C 
bM(L(AxB)xC) 
LAx(LBxMC) 
id,x tbc 
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where rL and c@ are natural isomorphisms 
Definition 5.3. An Y-strong monad over a Cartesian category V is a triple (k’, 9, tL) 
satisfying the following conditions: 
1. 9 = (L, E, 6, m, ml ) is a Cartesian comonad over Q?, 
2. J@ = (M,Q~) is a monad over %, 
3. tL is a Y-tensorial strength for M, 
4. the following diagrams commute: 
4,x pB 
I 
L.AxM’B 
Note that a strong monad is a special case of g-strong monad of which comonad 
structure is trivial. As is easily seen, a tensorial strength for M automatically becomes 
an Y-tensorial strength for A4 for any 9. The converse is not true in general as we 
shall see later. 
Example. We show an example of Z-strong monad over CPO. First we define a 
Cartesian comonad structure 91 = (Lt , E, 6, m, ml ) as follows: 
For a cpo A = (1, [r), let &A be the set of infinite increasing sequences over A; 
i.e., the underlying set of &A is {(u,)~~ 1 a, C an+1 for all n>O}. The elements 
are ordered COmpOnentWiSe; (&)Eo &,A (UL),“=o iff for all ?2>0, a, CA Uk. 
For a morphism f : A + B, let Lt f : LIA + LIB be defined by (Ltf)((u,),OO_,) = 
lf hx% 
&A((Un),DO,f)) = u,“=, U,. 
~A((%&) = (hJ,oO,o, where (h)i = ui 
4 
mA,B((h)E@ @n&)) = (@dd),OO=O . 
rnl(ll) = (ll)E,. 
This comonad structure is the same as the “increasing paths” comonad Tl studied in [2], 
except that Tl is defined on bounded-complete algebraic cpo’s. Next, let (M, q, p, t) be 
an arbitrary strong monad over CPO. Then (91, A!, t) becomes an 9-strong monad, 
where JZ = (M,q-,p). 
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Table 4 
Summary of the Y-strong monad semantics of the metalanguage 
Syntax Semantics 
I- tr type (l<i<n) 
X1 1 71,. ,Xn 1 7n k Xj 1 7i H 
Ttel :tl e 
f k e2 : 52 # 
r I- (q,e*) : 51 X 72 * 
rte.7, xt2 H 
I- k q(e) : 7; * 
f: 71 + 72 (function symbol) 
r k el : t, 
r t- f(el) : 72 
i-Fe:7 
r t [e] : MS * 
r t el :Mq * 
r,xl : 7, t- e2 :A452 * 
r t (let xi * el in e2) : M72 t) 
The monad structure of the above example has a tensorial strength. In Sections 6.5 
and 7.5, we will find examples from logic of which monad structure has no tensorial 
strength. 
5.2. Y-strong monad semantics 
Now, we shall define a new semantics of the computational metalanguage. 
Semantics of types: The interpretation of types is given by 0 = (%?, (A, 9, tL), d), 
where % is a Cartesian category, (A, 9, tL) is an Y-strong monad structure over ‘3, 
and 8 is a map from the set of basic types to Obj(%). 
We define [rj”,,,,, which is usually written as [r]l. Our interpretation of types is the 
same as Moggi’s one except that @4r]l is defined as ML[r]. 
Semantics of terms: The semantics [r k e : T];~,~ is defined as a morphism from 
LI[r]l to [z], i.e. it is defined as a morphism from [[r] to [z] in the co-Kleisli category 
VL. Here I is a pair (0, cp), and cp is a map which maps each function symbol f of 
arity ri + ~2 to a morphism q(f) : L[zI] --+ [z2]. I is called an interpretation. We 
usually write [[r I- e : z] for [r k e : r];,,,. Our interpretation is defined so that it will 
coincide with Moggi’s one when the comonad structure is trivial. 
The interpretation of variables, *, pairing, projections and mnction calls f(e) is 
easily defined (see Table 4), because gL is Cartesian. [r F [e] : A4,] is defined as 
[r F e : z]f ~~~1. let-expressions are interpreted as follows: Suppose 
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Then we have 
and 
Using these morphisms, we define 
[r t- (let x1 * el in e2) : Mz2] 
Note that the 9-tensorial strength is used here instead of a tensorial strength. 
Interpretation of equality judgments: We say that a judgment r I- ei =T e2 is true 
under I if and only if [r k ei : z&l,2 = [r t- e2 : T]L~,~ holds. Let E be an arbitrary 
set of equality judgments; then, by definition, I is a model of E if and only if every 
judgment in E is true under I. Then we have the following theorem: 
Theorem 5.4. The formal system given in Table 2 is sound and complete for the 
above interpretation. Speaking more exactly: 
l (Soundness) Let E be an arbitrary set of equality judgments, and I be any model 
of E. Then every judgment derived from E in the formal system is true under I. 
l (Completness) Let E be an arbitrary set of equality judgments. If an equality 
judgment J is true in every model I of E, then J is derived from E in the formal 
system. 
Proof. Completeness is proved very easily using Theorem 2.1. Recall that Moggi’s 
semantics is a special case of our new semantics. Suppose that J is true in every model 
I of E, where Z ranges over all interpretations in all z-strong monad structures. Then, 
in particular, J is true in every model I’ of E in the sense of Moggi’s semantics. 
Hence, by Theorem 2.1, J is derived from E. 
Soundness is proved by tedious but straightforward calculations of arrows. It is 
sufficient to show that each inference rule preserves truth. For illustration of the proof, 
we prove the case of M./I rule. The other cases are similar. Let A = [ri],B = [Q], C = 
[r&g1 = [r I- ei : zl] and g2 = [r,xi : ~1 F e2 : A&]. Then, 
i[r b let x1 -+ [el] in e2 : Mz2lj 
= (i&c, Cd’, m 1); $,ti; (w,A; 92 I* 
= (idLc,g(‘);(idLc x v~);t&,01;(m,~;g2)* 
= (idLc,g:);IlLcxLA;(111c,A;g2)* 
= (&,d’);m,A;g2 
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= (i&,g,)L;L92 
where id; is the identity on C in gL. 0 
6. Constructive modal logic 
In this section, we consider a constructive propositional modal logic called CS4, 
which corresponds to the notion of a Z-strong monad. 
6.1. cs4 
CS4 has A, V, and + as propositional connectives; T (true) and -L (false) as propo- 
sitional constants; and q ,o as modal operators. Of course, it has propositional variables. 
Its axioms and rules are as follows: 
1. It has all the axioms and rules of intuitionistic propositional logic. 
2. It has the necessitation rule for q : If A is a theorem (i.e. provable with no 
assumptions), then q A is also a theorem. 
3. It has the following seven axioms on the modal operators: 
o-K : q (A + B) --f (oA + q B) o-K : q (A -+ B) -+ (oA --+ oil) 
o-T: oA+A o-T : A ---t OA 
o-4: q A + q 2A o-4 : 02A -+ OA 
o_L-E : 01 + A. 
We define negation 1A as A -+ 1. 
Clearly, CS4 is a subsystem of the classical S4 modal logic. In classical S4, q 
and o are inter-definable. However, it is not possible in CS4. CS4 does not prove 
TUTA -+ oA. 
When a theory U is given by adding some formulas to CS4 as extra axioms, we 
say that U is a theory based on CS4. 
6.2. Type theoretical formulations 
We shall consider a type theory called TCS4 which is an extension of the computa- 
tional metalanguage. In later sections, we show that TCS4 exactly corresponds to CS4 
by the Curry-Howard correspondence. 
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The type formation rules of TCS4 are similar to those of the extended metalanguage 
except that the following new type-formation rule is added: 
k A type 
k LA type 
A type of the form LA is called a comonad type. 
The type inference rules are also similar to those of the extended metalanguage 
except that: (1) two kinds of new terms 
box f with q,. . . ,e, for x1,. . . ,x, 
and 
unbox e 
are introduced and the type inference rules for them are added; and (2) the syntax of 
a let-expression is changed to 
let x -+ e in f with el,. . . ,e, for x1,. . . ,x, 
(xl,. . . ,x,,x are variables, and ei, . . . , e, are terms) and the type inference rule for it 
is also changed. Free variables of these new terms are determined as follows: 
1. In d E (box f with el,..., e, for xl,., ., ;c,), all free variables of f must be 
contained in {xi,. . . , x,}, and all of them become bound in d. The free variables in 
et,...,e, remain free in d. 
2. The free variables of unbox e are those of e. 
3. In d E (let x + e in f with el,..., e, for x1 ,..., xn), all free variables of f 
must be in {xi , . . . ,x,,,x}, and all of them become bound in d. The free variables in 
ei,. . . ,e,,e remain free in d. 
Notation 6.1. Sometimes we write 
1 
L”A for L.. . L A (M”A is similar) 
tTn for el,...,e,, 
dl<i<kfor dl,...,dk-l, 
dkci<mfor dk+l,...,dm, 
X,: xn for x1 : AI,...,~,,: A,,, 
box f for box f with el,. . . ,e, for xl,. . . ,x, if n = 0, 
letxee in f for letxee in f with el,..., e, for-xl ,..., x, ifn=O. 
Table 5 summarizes the inference rules of TCS4. The definition of TCS4 depends 
on the choice of the set of constant symbols. Accordingly, when a set C of constant 
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Table 5 
Type inference rules of TCS4 
Rules for constants and variables: 
Const. r I- c: A (c is a constant of type A) Var,, k Ai type (1 <i<n) ~l:Al,...,x,:A,~-i:Ai 
Rules for product types: 
1.1 r k *: 1 
Rules for coproduct types: 
r k el : Al 
+I1 r I- 
k AZ type r kez:Az FAI type 
inl A,,A2(el): AI +A2 
+ I.2 
I- k lnr_+,A2(e2): Al +A2 
r te.A1+Az T,xl:A,tc:A3 r,x2:A2td:A, 
+‘I3 T!- case e of inlR,,A2(xl)+cjj inrR,,A,(x2)+d: A3 
Rules for function types: 
r,x:Al t-e:Az 
-‘I r I- (I.x: A1.e): Al - A2 
+E rte:A1-+A2 rkel:AC 
r I- eel : A2 
Rules for comonad types: 
LI r t-ei: LA; (16iGn) A t f: B r t (box S with el,...,e, for _qr...,nn): LB (’ EX’ ’ LA1’..‘~xn’ LAn) 
L.E r t-e: LA 
r I- unboxe:A 
Rules for monad types 
M.Z r ke:A r t- [e] : MA 
M.E r te:MA r kei:L&(l<i<n) A,x:Ak f:MB 
r t- (let x + e in f with el,. . . , en for XI,. , . , x,): MB (A z x1 : LAl,...,xn: LA,,) 
M0.E r I-e:MO 
r k?AM(e): A 
symbols is given, we write TCS4(C) to denote the type theory determined by C. If T 
is of the form TCS4(C), T is called a type theory based on TCS4. 
6.3. Encoding modal logic in type theory 
We show how to encode a theory based on CS4 in a type theory based on TCS4. 
In the following, we assume that a bijection BType : PV - BT is given, where PV 
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is the set of propositional variables of CS4 and BT is the set of basic types of TCS4. 
We define a mapping Type from propositions of CS4 to types of TCS4 inductively 
as follows: 
Type(P) = BType(P) (P is a propositional variable) 
Type(T) = 1 Type(l) = 0 
Type(A A B) = Type(A) x Type(B) Type(A V B) = Type(A) + Type(B) 
Type(A --f B) = Type(A) + Type(B) 
Type(oA) = L( Type(A )) Type(oA) = WType(A)) 
Clearly, Type becomes a bijection and hence we write Prop for the inverse of Type. 
For a typing judgment r I- e : A, we define 
Prop(T) = Prop(A1 ), . . . , Pro&A,), 
Prop(T t- e : A) = (Prop(T) I- Prop(A)) 
provided that r is xi : Al,. . . ,xn : A,. 
Suppose that we have a mapping AxConst which maps each proposition P of CS4 
to a constant symbol A&o&(P) of type Type(P). When a theory U based on CS4 
is given, we let Co = {AxConst(P) 1 P E Ax(U)}, where Ax(U) is the set of proper 
axioms of U (i.e. axioms of U which is not in original CS4). We define a type theory 
9-F(U) by FY(U) = TCS4(&). 
Conversely, when a type theory T = TCS4(C) is given, we define a propositional 
theory BY(T) by YF(T) = CS4 + {Prop(typeof(c)) 1 c E C}, where typeof is 
the type of the constant symbol c. 
Then we have the following theorem: 
Theorem 6.2. Let Al,. . . , A,, be a sequence of propositions and x1, , . . ,x,, be a sequence 
of distinct variables. If we have Al,. . . , A,, k B in a propositional theory U based on 
CS4, then 
x1 : rype(Al), . . .,x, : Type(A,) I- e : Type(B) 
is derivable in FF(U) for some term e. 
Proof. Clearly, the intuitionistic propositional logic is encoded in FF(U), since we 
have product, (weak) coproduct, and function types. Therefore, it is sufhcient to con- 
sider the proper axioms, the necessitation rule, and the axioms for modal operators. 
We write A’ for Type(A). 
l Proper axioms: If A is a proper axiom, we can prove k AxConst(A) : Type(A) in 
YY( U). 
l Necessitation rule: Suppose that k e: A’ is derived for some e. Then we have 
l- boxe:M. 
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l Axiom UK : q (A -+ B) -+ (oA + q B). We have 
k AX : L(A’ -+ B’). ly : LA’. box (unbox n’)(unbox y’) with n, y for x’, y’ 
:L(A’+B’)+LA’ALB’ 
in TCS4. 
a Axiom q T : q A 4 A. We can derive k Ix: LA’. unbox x: LA’ -+ A’. 
l Axioms 04 : q A + q 2A. TCS4 proves k Izx : LA’. box y with x for y : LA’ --) L’A’. 
l Axiom OK : q (A + B) + (oA -+ oB). We have 
k Lx: L(A’ --) B’).ly: MA’. let y’ + y in [(unbox x’)y’] with x for x’ 
: L(A’ + B’) ---) MA’ + MB’. 
a Axiom OT : A --t oA. We have 13Lx : A’. [x] : A’ ---f MA’. 
l Axiom 04:o’A-+oA. Wecanprove I-Ix:M’A.lety+x in y:M’A’-+MA’. 
l Axiom o_LE : 01 4 A. We have k Ix : MO.??(x) : MO + A’. 0 
Conversely, we have the following theorem: 
Theorem 6.3. If r k e: A is derived in type theory T based on TCS4, then we have 
Prop(T !- e : A) in 99(T). 
Proof. We prove by induction on the derivation of the typing judgment. Consider the 
last rule applied. Each rule for variables, product types, coproduct ypes, and function 
types clearly corresponds to an inference of the intuitionistic propositional logic. Hence, 
we consider the other rules. 
l Rule Const. If c is a constant of type A in T, we have Prop(A) as an axiom of 
YF(T). Therefore, we have Prop(T) k Prop(A). 
l Rule L. I. We show that r k q B is derivable from 
r t q A; (1 <i<n) (1) 
and 
q AI,..., q A, I- B. 
From (1) and 04, we have 
r t- q oAi (1 <i<n). 
Further, we have 
(2) 
(3) 
t- a(oAi -+ (nA2 + (. . . @A, -+ B) +. .))) (4) 
from (2), successively applying implication introduction and necessitation. Therefore 
we can obtain r l- q B from (4) and (3), repeatedly using UK. 
l Rule L.E. If r t- q A, then r k-A by UT. 
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l Rule M.Z. If Z t A, then Z t- OA by oT. 
l Rule M. E. We show that Z k OB is derivable from 
l- t oA, (5) 
Z I- OAi (1 <i<n) (6) 
and 
q AI,..., q A,,A k oB. (7) 
Just like the case of the L.Z rule. we can derive 
r t q (A + OB) (8) 
from (6) and (7). Then we have OB from (8) and (5) using OK and 04. 
l Rule M0.E. If Z t ol, we have Z t A by olE. 0 
6.4. Categorical semantics of CS4 
Let us give a categorical semantics of theories based on CS4 using the notion of an 
Y-strong monad. 
Definition 6.4. (59, (A, _!Y, tL)) is a CS4 structure if and only if the following condi- 
tions hold: 
1. % is a weakly co-Cartesian ccc. 
2. (A, 9, tL) is an z-strong monad over %. 
3. The monad functor of A preserves weak initial objects. 
The last condition is needed to interpret 01-E. 
Suppose that a CS4 structure Y = (Q?, (4, 9, tL)) is given. The interpretation of 
formulas of CS4 is defined as follows: First, we arbitrarily choose a mapping m : PV + 
Obj(C). The pair Z = (9, m) is called an interpretation. Then we define [Arcs4 E Obj(C) 
for each formula A. We often write [A] for [A] &. [A] is inductively defined as follows: 
[Pp] = nr(P) (P is a propositional variable) 
IT] = 1 [1] = 0 
[AAB]I=[A]x[B] [A V B] = [A] + [B] 
i[A ---f BI = WI * IPI) 
[CIA] = L[AA]I i[ OA] = M[A]. 
For T=A I,...,A,, define [Z]&,, = [AI]&, x . . . x [An]&. If n = 0, let [Z]‘,,, = 1. 
Definition 6.5. (1) We say that a formula A is valid under an interpretation Z if and 
only if [A];, has a global element. 
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(2) We say that r k A is valid under an interpretation I if and only if there exists 
a morphism from IT]‘,,, to [[A]‘,,,. 
(3) Z is called a model of U if and only if every provable formula of U is valid 
under I. 
This semantics is sound and complete in the following sense: 
Theorem 6.6. Suppose that U is a theory based on CS4. Then the following propo- 
sitions hold 
1. (Soundness) If each proper axiom of U is valid under I, then I is a model of U. 
2. (Completeness) If A is not provable in U, then there exists a model I of U such 
that A is not valid under I. 
We prove this theorem later, using a categorical semantics of TCS4. 
6.5. Categorical semantics of TCS4 
We shall define a categorical semantics of TCS4. 
Semantics of Types: Assume that a CS4 structure Y= (%, (A, 9, t”)) is given. We 
choose a mapping 0 from the set of basic types BT to Obj(C). Then we define [A],“,, 
for each type A, where 0 is the pair (Y,(9). We often abbreviate [A],“,,, as [A]. It is 
defined as follows: 
[A] = g(A) (A is a basic type) 
[l] = 1 i[o]l = 0 
[A x B] = [A] x [B]I [A + B] = [A] + [B] 
[A + BD = ([AA] + l[BIl) 
[LA] = L[A] [MA] = MI[A]. 
For a typing context r = xi : Al,. . . ,x, : A,, we define [r] = [A,] x . . . x [A,,]. 
Semantics of Terms: To define the semantics of terms, we choose a map y which 
maps each constant symbol c of type A to a global element y(c) : 1 -+ [A]. The pair 
(0, y) is called an interpretation. 
We define 
by induction on the derivation of r t e : A. The interpretation of constants, variables, 
rules for product, coproduct, and function types is similar to the case of the extended 
metalanguage. The interpretation of comonad types and monad types are as follows: 
Since L preserves the cartesian structure, 
(L(4),. *. 2 L(z;)) :L(A, x ... x A,) + L(A,) x ... x L(A,) 
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Table 6 
Categorical semantics of TCS4 
Semantics 
fp,:m”kf:B 
r t (box f with Q for t):LB 
Tke:LA 
Ft- unbox e:A 
Tke:A 
r t- [e] : MA 
Tke:MA 
rFei:LA; (lCi<n) 
&,:LA,, x:At- f :MB 
rE(letx+ein f withCnfor2n):MB 
rte:MO 
r k?y(e):A 
H hi 
@ 9 
H (hl,...,h,);m,A,lx...X,An,;((mIAIIX...X[A,,)-’;g)A 
‘3 9 
H 9; E[A] 
‘3 9 
w 9; ‘1[A] 
@ 91 
H hi 
w 92 
-3 ((hl,...,h”);m]A,]x...x]A,],S1); 
t~,~...~A.,A;(((m]AI]X.~~x(A,])-’ x id[A]);92)* 
* 9 
e 9’ ?M 
’ IA] 
is an isomorphism. We write mA, x...xA, for its inverse. Then we define 
jjr k (box fi with el,. . . ,e, for x1,. . . ,x,) :LB] 
= (h l,...,h,);my,,x...x,AA,,;((m,A,,x...x,A.,)-l;g)A 
I[r k (let x + e in f2 with el,.. .,e, for XI,. ..,xn):MB] 
= ((hl,... ,h,);m~AA,]x...xnA.],9i);tAL,,....xA.,A;(((m,A,jx...~nA.,)-’ X id[A]);92)* 
- 
g2 = I[& :LA,,x:A 1 f2 :hm]. 
The interpretation of the other rules is easy; see Table 6. 
Equality Rules: According to this semantics, we introduce a formal system of equal- 
ity judgments for TCS4-terms. 
The system has the inference rules of the many sorted equational logic, rules for 
product, coproduct and function types. They are the same as those of the extended 
metalanguage described in Section 3. In addition, the system has rules for comonad 
types and monad types. They are summarized in Table 7. 
By definition, r k ei =Z e2 is true if and only if [r I- el : z] = [r k e2 : z] holds. The 
definition of a model is similar to those in Sections 2.3 and 5.2. 
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Table 7 
Equality rules for TCS4 terms 
Inference rules of many sorted equational logic, rules for product, coproduct and function types: 
_ Same as those of extended metalanguage. 
Rules for comonad types: 
box.5 
rFe?i=Lai ej(I<iGn) .?“:E&Ff =B f’ 
r t (box f with & for X,) =LB (box f’ with z for X,) 
unbox. < 
r I- e =LA e’ 
r F- unbox e =A unbox e’ 
Tkei:LAi (l<iQn) X,:LA,k f:Bk 
b0x.ass.k 
rtd:LBi(I<i<m,i#k) ?;,:%mFg:C 
r F (box g with ;ilGiCk,(box f with & for X,).;lkCiGm for J,) 
=LC (box ([box f with 2” for f,,/yk]g) 
with li - - l~lck~en,dkii$m O'YIGi<k%Yk<i$m f - 
_ 
) 
L.B 
rkei:L.4i (l<iQn) .fn:LA,kJ:13 
r F unbox (box f with ~7” fort) =B [i/zi”lf 
L.rl 
rtei:LAi (l<i<n) &:E& tf:LB 
r F (box (unbox f) with ~7” for 2”) =LB [&/&]f 
Rules for monad types: 
t-1.5 
r t e =A e’ 
r t [el =MA VI 
let. r 
TI-e=MR e’ rFei=LR, e! (l<i<n) &:E,,,x:AF f =MB f’ 
r t (let x + e in f with & for X.) =MB (let x + e’ in f’ with z for a) 
r k e:MA r I- ej:LAi (I lion) 
let. ass 
zF”:LA,,x:AI- f :MB Tl-d:LBi (l<i<m) y,:&,y:Btg:MC 
r t (let y + (let x + e in f with & fort) in g with &, for 5i,) 
=MC (let x + e in (let y + f in g with & for K) with 
&,& fort,&) 
rte:MA rEej:LAi (l<i<n) &:LA, I- f:Bk 
let. box. comm . k 
TFg:LBi (l<i<m,i#k) jjj:%,,x:Al-g:MC 
r t (letx + e in g with ;il+<k,(box f with & fort), 
&<i<m for Y,) =,uc (let x + e in ([(box f with I& 
M.B rFe:A rEei:LAi (l<i<n) _&:z,,x:AF f :MB 
r F (let x + [e] in f with i for J-&) =MB [e,i/x,t]f 
51 
M.rl 
TFe:MA rEei:LAi (l<i<n) 
r t (let x -+ e in [x] with Q for &) =M~ e 
52 S. Kobayashil Theoretical Computer Science I75 (1997) 29-74 
We can prove the following theorem: 
Theorem 6.1. This formal system is sound and complete with respect to the above 
interpretation. 
Proof. Soundness is proved by straightforward calculations of morphisms. For illus- 
tration, we show that M. q rule is valid. Let gt = [r t e :A&!] and hi = [r k ei :LAi] 
(1 <i<n). Then 
i[r k (let x -+ e in [x] with l$ for X,):MA] 
= ((hl,...,h,);my,,x...x,~,,,g1);tAL,,...xA,,A; 
(((~,.41,X...X,‘4~,)-1 x idpI); $$; rpl)* 
= ((h 1,...,h,);M,A,,x...x,A”,,g1);tAL,,...xA,,A;(712;~~Aj)* 
= (@I, . . ..h.);mnA,,x...x,~A,,,g1);tAL,,....xA,,A;M(712) 
= (@ 1,...,h,);“aA,lx...x,~A,,,g1);712 
= 91. 
Hence M. q rule is valid. 
The proof of completeness is similar to Moggi’s proof for Theorem 2.1. Suppose that 
an arbitrary set of equality judgments E is given. Then we prove that: if an equation 
r 1 et =r e2 is true in all models of E, then the equation is derived from E in the 
formal system. We define a category F(E) by the following construction: 
l Objects of 9(E) are types. 
l A morphism from A to B is an equivalence class [x : A k e : BIN of typed terms with 
respect to the equivalence relation “N” defined by 
(x:,4 k et :B) N (x:A k e2:B) iff (x:,4 t-et =se2) is derived from E, 
provided that (x : A b e : B) is identified with (y : A t- [ y/x]e : B) when y does 
not occur in e. Terms of the form (x1 :At,...,x,,:A, t- e:B) with n # 1 are not 
considered as morphisms. 
l Composition is substitution, i.e. 
([x:Ai-e:B],);([y:Bi-f:C],)=[x:Ak[e/y]f:C], 
l The identity on A is [x:A t-x:&. 
Then F(E) has a CS4 structure 9’ = (W, (A, 9, tL)) defined as follows: 
. %? = F(E). 
l The structure of ccc is defined by 
- l=l and!A=[x:Ak*:l],, 
-AxB=AxB, 
- 7&B = [x: A x B k XI(X) : A]_, and rt$s = [x: A x B k 712(x): BIN. 
- ([x:Cl-e:A],,[x:Ckf:B],)=[x:Ct-(e,f):AxB],, 
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- A=+B=(A+B), 
- A[x:CxAFe:B],=[x:Ckly:A.[(x,y)/x]e:A--+B]+_ 
_ evaZA,B = [x: (A -+ B) x A k (711(x))(7c2(x)):B],. 
l The weakly co-Cartesian structure is defined by 
- 0 = 0 and ?A = [x:0 F?A(x):&, 
- A+B=A+B, 
_ inlA,B = [X : A t it-&B(x) : A + BIN and inrA,B = [x : B k inrA,tl(x) : A + BINI 
- The weak coproduct arrow [[x : A t e : Cl,, [y : B t- f : Cl,] is 
[Z : (A + B) t- (case z of it-&,B(x) + e 11 inr&y) + f) : Cl,. 
l The Cartesian comonad structure is defined by 
- L(A) = LA, 
_ &A = [X&d k unbox X:&, 
- ([x:LA k e:B],)A = [x:LA t (box e with x for x):LB],, 
- ml = [x: 1 I- (box *):Ll],, 
- mA,B is 
[x:LA x LB t- (box (unbox yl, unbox y2) 
with nl(x), 74x) for ~1, ~2) :L(A x B)]_,. 
l The monad structure is defined by 
- M(A) = MA, 
- y]A = [x:A k [x]:MA],, 
- ([x:A k e:MB],)* = [y:MA I- (letx + y in e):MB],. 
l The .9-tensorial strength for A4 is defined by 
t,& = [x:LA x MB I- let y + Q(X) in [(z, y)] 
with X,(X) for z:M(LA x B)]_. 
Proposition 6.8. The above construction gives a CS4 structure. 
Proof. See the appendix. 
This CS4 structure is called the canonical CS4 structure for E. We interpret the lan- 
guage in this CS4 structure as follows: Define B(A)=A for each basic type A. Let O= 
(y,e). Then [A]‘& = A holds for any type A. Define y(c) = [x: 1 I- c : typeof (c)I_,. 
Then we have 
[r F e:A]T& = [r I- e:A],. 
This interpretation is called the canonical interpretation of E. 
Now suppose that r E el =A e2 is true in any model of E. Then, as a special case, it 
is true under the canonical interpretation of E. Therefore, [r F et : A], = [f t e2 : Alw 
holds, and hence r F et =A e2 is derivable from E. This shows that our formal system 
is complete. 
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Thus, we have proved Theorem 6.7. 0 
Note that the monad structure defined in this proof cannot have a tensorial strength 
in general, because A A OB + o(A A B) is not necessarily valid in CS4. 
Proof of Theorem 6.6. As an application of the above theorem, we shall give a proof 
of Theorem 6.6. 
(Soundness) Suppose that each proper axiom of U is valid under I = (9, a). 
Choose an element eA : 1 -+ [A]‘,,, for each proper axiom A. Then we construct an 
interpretation of YY( U) as follows: First define O(A) = [Prop(A)]‘,,,. Let 0 = (Y, 0). 
Clearly [Type(A)] $& = [A]‘,,,. Then define y by y(c) = eA, where c = AxConst(A). 
Note that y is well-defined, because each constant symbol of YY(U) is of the form 
AxConst(A) and of type Type(A) for some proper axiom A of U. 
Now let A be a provable formula of U. Then, by Theorem 6.2, we have k e : Type(A) 
in FY(U) for some e. Therefore we have [ l- e: Type(A$&, : 1 + [Type(A)]$&. 
This means that A is valid under I, because [Type(A)$& = [A]‘,,,. Since A is arbitrary, 
I is a model of U. 
(Completeness) Suppose that A is not provable in U. Then we have no e such 
that l- e : Type(A) in YY( U). Consider the canonical interpretation I = (0, y) = 
((Y, f3), y) of E, where E is the set of all provable equality judgments of YY( U). 
Then I[ D&A >ll~cs4 has no global element. This means that A is not valid under the 
model I, where Z = (9, w) is defined by D(P) = &Type(P)). 0 
6.6. Collapsing map 
In this section, we define a mapping toll called the “collapsing map”. Let T be 
a type theory based on TCS4. The map toll collapses T to the extended metalanguage, 
deleting all of the comonad-related structures of T. For readability, we often write A- 
for coZZ(A). From now on, we simply write “the metalanguage” to mean “the extended 
metalanguage”. 
First we define the collapsing map for the types of T. Let mltype be a mapping 
which maps each basic type B of T to a type mZtype(B) of the metalanguage. Then 
coZZ(A) is defined as the result of erasing all occurrences of L in A and replac- 
ing each occurrence of a basic type B by mZtype(B). For the precise definition, see 
Table 8. 
Next we define the collapsing map for the terms of T. We assume that we are given 
a mapping mlterm which maps each constant symbol c of type A in T to a term 
mZterm(c) such that I- mZterm(c) : coZZ(A) is derivable in the metalanguage. Then the 
definition of coZZ(e) is given in Table 8. 
Then we collapse judgments. The mapping COZZ collapses all occurrences of types 
and terms in judgments. The precise definition is given in Table 8. 
Finally, we define the collapsing map for inference rules. Suppose that J,, . . . , J,,/J is 
either a type formation rule or a type inference rule or an equality rule, where Jl, . . . , J, 
and J are judgments (n 2 0). Then the collapsed image of this judgment is defined as 
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Table 8 
Collapsing map 
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Collapsing types: 
A- = &type(A) (A is a basic type) 
1- = 1 (AXE)- =(A- xB-) 
o- =o (A+B)- = (A- +B-) 
(A --+ B)- = (A- -+ B-) 
(LA)- = A- (MA)- =MA- 
Collapsing terms: 
C- = &term(c) (c is a constant) 
*- =* 
(e,d)- = (e-,d-) 
(inla,B(e))- = inl,-,B-(e-) 
(case e of inla,B(x) * c)linr&y) * d)- 
= (case e- of id,-,,-(x) * c-llinr,-,,-(y) * d-) 
(Ix:A.e)- =Ix:A-.e- 
(box f with el,. . . ,e, for xl,. .,x,,- 
= [e;,..., eTh,...,xnlf- 
(unbox e)- = e- 
(let x JF e in f with el,. ,e, for xl,. .,xn)- 
= (letx ti e- in [e; ,..., e,/xl,..., xn]f-) 
(?y(e))- =?“_ (e-) 
A 
Collapsing judgments: 
(E A type)- = (t A- type) 
(rte:B)-=(Ft-ee-:B-) 
(r k el =B ez)- = (F t- (e,)- =B- (e2)-) 
X- = x (x is a variable) 
(?A(e))- = ?A- (e-) 
(Xi(e))- = nj(e-) 
(h&d))- = inrA-,B-(d-) 
(fe)- = f-e- 
[e]- = [e-l 
In the above, F means x1 : A;, . , x,,:A,, if r is x1 :A1 ,..., x,:A,. 
Jr,..., J*-/J-. Recall that the + .u rule has the side condition “x $! DV(T)“. This 
condition is mapped to the side condition “x $ DV(T- ),,. 
Lemma 6.9. A collapsed term ([el,. . .,e,fxl,. . .,x,,]e)- is identical to [e,, . . . ,e;/ 
xl,. . . ,x,le-, i.e. the collapsing map commutes with substitution, 
Proof. Straightforward induction on the complexity of e. q 
Theorem 6.10. (1) Zf k A type is derived in T, then (t- A type)- is derived in the 
metalanguage. 
(2) Each type inference rule of T is collapsed to a derived rule of the metalanguage. 
(3) Zf Z k e : A is derived in T, then (Z k e : A)- is derived in the metalanguage. 
(4) Each equality rule of T is collapsed to a derived rule of the metalanguage. 
(5) Zf Z k- e =A er is derived in T, then (Z I- e =A et)- is derived in the metalan- 
guage. 
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Proof. (1) Clear. 
(2) It is trivial for the cases other than the L.I, LB and M.E rules. 
The LJ rule is collapsed to 
r-l-e,:A; (l<i<n) xl:A,,...,x,:A; k f-:B- 
P t [e,, . . . , et/xl,. . . ,xJf- : B- 
The lower judgment is derived from the upper judgments by substitution rule. Hence, 
this is a derived rule. 
The LB rule is collapsed 
r- k e- : A- 
r- Fe- :A-’ 
which is a trivial rule. 
The ME rule is collapsed 
to 
to 
r- k e- : MA- r- I- ely :A; (l<i<n) 
x1 :A;,..., x,,:A,,x:A- k f- :MB- 
r- I- (let x * e- in [e- , ,..., eT/xl,..., xn]f-):MB-’ 
From the upper judgments, we can derive T-,x: A- k [e;, . . . ,e;/xi,. . . ,x&f- : 
MB-. Thus, by the typing rule for let-expressions, we can derive the lower judgment. 
(3) Immediate from (2). 
(4) It is clear for the cases other than the rules for comonad and monad types. 
The cases of the rules box. 5, unbox. t, [-I. 5 and let. 5 are trivial. 
Consider the rules L . /I and L . q. The lower judgment of L ./I is collapsed to 
r- k [e;, . . . , e;/xl, . . . ,x,]f- =B- ([ei, . . . , en/xl,. . . ,x,]f)-, 
which is trivially derivable by the last lemma. The case of L .q is similar. 
Consider the rules box. ass. k and let. box. comm . k. The lower judgment of the 
box. ass .k rule is collapsed to r- k hi =c- hz, where 
- 
(dl<iik)- =d,,...~dkTl, 
- 
(dk-ci<m)- =dkJl,..*‘d,. 
By the property of substitution, hi and h2 are identical. Hence, the collapsed rule is 
trivially derivable. The case of the let. box. ass. k rule is similar. 
The let. ass rule is collapsed to 
r-Fe-:MA- r-ke,:A; (lGi<n) 
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x,:(&)-,x:A- I- f-:MB- Z- k4-:B; (l<i<m) 
y,:(B,)-,y:B- kg-:MC- 
r- t- (let y * (let x * e- in [(&)-/f&f-) in [(&)-&Jg-) 
=Mc- (let x + e- in (let y x= [(&J/&]f-in [(dj)-/5i,]g-)) 
where X, : (A,)- means x1 :A- , , . . . ,x, : A;. From the upper judgments, we have 
T-,x : A- t [(&)-/&]f- : MB- and r-, y : B- k [(&)-/j$]g- : MC-. Hence, 
we can derive the lower judgment by the ass rule of the metalanguage. 
l The M. /3 rule is collapsed to 
r-Fe_:A- r-ke,:Ai (l<i<n) Zn:(&)-,x:A-k f-:MB- 
r- t- (let x * [e-] in [(&)-/fJf-) =MB- [e-,(&-/x,lS,]f- . 
From the upper judgments, we have r-, x:A- k [(&)-/X,Jf- :MB-. Therefore, 
we can derive the lower judgment by the M.p rule of the metalanguage. 
l The M.q rule is collapsed to 
r-‘r-ee-:MA- r-l-ei:Ai (l<i<n) 
r- t (lot x + e- in [x]) =MA- e- 
This rule is derived from the M. q rule of the metalanguage. 
(5) Immediate from (4). 0 
7. Modal logic proofs as programs 
We shall discuss how to regard CS4 proofs as programs. We can answer this question 
as follows: 
1. Interpret a deduction r k A in CS4 (or a judgment r k e : A in TCS4) in a 
suitable CS4 structure over some category %‘. Then we obtain an arrow f : [r] + I[A]I 
in %?. If we can regard arrows in %? as functional programs, then we can consider that 
we have derived a program from a proof. 
2. We consider a metalanguage term as a program. Prove some judgment r t e : A 
in TCS4, and collapse it to a metalanguage term. 
However, these answers are too abstract. How can we write the specification of a 
program? How will the derived program work? 
To give an answer to these questions, we define a realizability interpretation of CS4 
and prove that we can extract a program from a proof using the interpretation. 
In the following, we shall consider only extraction of side-effecting programs, 
because modal logics are suitable for reasoning on state-dependent propositions. 
Applications to other kind of programs are under investigation, 
7.1. Generalized side-effect monad 
To keep the argument as general as possible, we first introduce a slightly generalized 
notion of side-effect monad. In what follows, we write j for Hom( l,A), the set of 
global elements of A. 
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Definition 7.1. Let S be an arbitrary non-empty set. A generalized side-effect monad 
over S is a structure (U, (A4, q, p, t), R) satisfying the following conditions: 
1. V is a weakly co-Cartesian ccc, 
2. (M,q,p,t) is a strong monad over q, 
3. R is a family of relations such that for each A E Obj(C) and each e E MA, R, is 
a binary relation of the form R, C S x (2 x S), and 
4. R satisfies the following three conditions: 
(Rl) RII;,,* = {(s,(a,s)) /s E S} for each A E Obj(%) and a E d, 
(R2) R,;f* = {(s,(b,s”))IW.3.~‘.( s, ( a’,s’)) E R, A (s’,(b,s”)) E R,f;f} for any 
A,B E Obj(%?) and f : A + MB, 
W) R+,q;t, B = {(s,(c,s’)) 1 !%‘.(s,(b’,s’)) ERbAc = (a,b’)} for anyA,BEObj(V), 
aEAandbE=. 
Of course, the side-effect monads defined in Section 2 are naturally considered as 
generalized side-effect monads with obviously defined R. 
In what follows, we shall consider only generalized side effect monads of which 
monad functor preserves weak initials. An element of S is called a state. A global 
element of the form e : 1 -+ MA is called a command, because it is thought of as a 
side-effecting computation. We adopt the following abbreviations: 
s p s’ H 3e’ . (sR,(e’,s’)), s + s’ H EL4 .3e E MA. (s p s’). 
Lemma 7.2. (1) + is rejlexive. 
(2) + is transitive. 
(3) R,;M(j-) = {(s, ((a’; f)~‘)) I (s,(a’,s’>) E &I. 
(4) R,;, = {(s,(b,s”)) ~3~‘.3s’.(s,(a’,s’)) E R, A (s’,(b,s”)) E R,,}. 
Proof. (1) Let e = qi : 1 + Ml, then s F s. 
(2) Suppose that s p s’ and s’ < s” for some e E MA and e’ E MB. Let e” = 
I?” 
(e; (!A; e’)*). Then s + s”. 
(3), (4) Immediate from the conditions (Rl) and (R2). 0 
7.2, Definition of realizability 
7.2.1. Informal discussion 
First, we shall informally explain the ideas behind our realizability interpretation. 
We think that OA means that: there exists a command e such that the execution 
of e terminates, and after every terminating execution of e, A becomes true. Then 
a realizer of OA must give a command e and a realizer a which realizes A after the 
execution of e. Since the truth of A depends on states and e may be non-deterministic, 
the realizer a must be chosen depending on how e has been executed. Accordingly, 
it is natural to think that a must be returned by e as the resulting value. That is, we 
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think that a realizer of OA is a command e E MA which terminates and returns a 
realizer of A. 
Next, we think that q A means that: for all command e, after every terminating 
execution of e,A becomes true. That is, q A means that the truth of A is never changed 
by any execution of any command. Then it is natural to think that a realizer of q A at 
the state s is such a that a realizes A at s’ for all s’ with s + s’. Since + is reflexive, 
if a realizes q A at s, then a also realizes A at s. Therefore the type of a realizer of 
q A must be the same as that of realizers of A. 
Along these lines, we shall give the formal definition of realizability. 
7.2.2. Formal definition 
Suppose that a genearlized side-effect monad (59, (M, q,,u, t), R) is given. First we 
arbitrarily choose two mappings p and r so that p(P) be an object of %? and r(s,P) 
be a subset of p(P) for each propositional variable P and state s E S. 
Type of realizers: Next we define ((A))p for each proposition A as follows: 
W), = P(P) (P is a propositional variable) 
U))P = 1 (PDP = 0 
((A A4), = ((4)~ x 09)~ ((A ” B))P = (6% + @))P 
((A ---f @)p = (((4~ =+ @))P) 
@4), = ((4)p ((4)P = M((4,. 
Intuitively, ((A))r is the type of realizers of A. For r = Al,. . . ,A,, we define ((r)), = 
((A& x . . . x (Mn))p 
Set of realizers: We define ‘9$,&A) for each state s and each proposition A as 
follows: 
!l&,,(s,P) = r(s,P) (P is a propositional variable) 
!I&-(s, T) = {idI} (singleton) 
%ip,r(s, I) = 0 (null set) 
%&,A A B) = {(a, b) ) a E %i,,(s,A) A b E 9$,&B)} 
%&A V R) = {a; inl((A)jp,((s)jp I a E ~i,,W)} 
“{b; W(A))~, ((B))~ I b E %,rW)l 
‘%,A+4 + f9 = {e E ((A -+ B))p I Va E %&,A). (e‘a E %&s,B))} 
‘%r(s,nA) = {e E ((oA))~ IIfs E S. (s + s’ + e E %&s’,A))} 
‘%r(s,oA) = {e E ((OA))p I@ .s c s’) A Ve’Vs’(sR,(e’,s’) + e’ E ‘$$&s’,A))} 
where e‘a is an abbreviation of (e,a); eval. Note that %,,Js,A) is defined as a subset 
of ((A))p. Y$,Js,A) is the set of all realizers of A at the state s. 
60 S. Kobayashil Theoretical Computer Science 175 (1997) 29-74 
We write e r!” A for e E ‘$$,~(s, A) and read it as “e realizes A at the state s (under 
the interpretation (p, r))“. 
Definition 7.3. (1) We write e r PJ A to mean that er$“‘A holds for all states s E S. It 
is read as “e realizes A (under the interpretation (p,r))“. 
(2) A formula A is realizable (under (p,r)) if and only if erpJ A holds for some e. 
(3) Let f be an arrow, and let Al,. . . ,A, and A be CS4-formulas. Let r E Al,. . . , A,. 
Then f r!“(r k A) holds, by definition, if and only if the following conditions hold: 
(a) f : ((0, + (k4hT 
(b) for all al E ((AI))~, . . . ,a, E ((An))p, we have 
(alr,P”A1)A... A(a,r,P”A,) + ((al,...,an); f)r,P”A. 
(4) We write f rp,r (r k A) to mean that f r?‘(r t A) holds for all states s. 
(5) r l- A is realizable (under (p,r)) if and only if we have f rQpr (r k A) for 
some f. 
Note that f r?‘(t A) is equivalent to f $‘A. 
We w&e ((A)), s (s,A), r, and r for ((A))p, 9$,,& A), r!” and rp,r respectively, when 
p and r are clear from the context. 
7.3. Soundness of the realizability interpretation 
We can prove the following theorem: 
Theorem 7.4. Let U be a theory based on CS4 and assume that all proper axioms 
of U are realizable under (p,r). Suppose that T F A is derivable in U. Then T k A 
is realizable under (p, r). 
Proof. We prove by induction on the derivation of r k A. It is easy to see that all 
the axioms of intuitionistic logic are realizable and the intuitionistic rules preserve re- 
alizability. Accordingly, we shall consider the necessitation rule and the seven axioms 
on the modal operators. 
l The necessitation rule. Assume that e realizes F A. Then er, A for all s. Hence, if 
s + s’, we have er,/ A. Thus e realizes t q A. 
l We show that o-K is realizable. It is sufficient to show that eval realizes 
(o(A + B),oA 1 q B). Suppose f r, q (A + B), er,o(A) and s + s’. Then we have 
f r,/ (A -+ B) and er,tA. Hence ((f, ) e ; eval) r,t B. Since s’ is arbitrary, we have 
((f, e); eval) r, q B. 
l o-T and o-4. It is sufficient to show id(lA)) r&A k A) and id((A)) r&A k q 2A). 
These are obvious, because + is reflexive and transitive. 
l o-K. We show tfiA_B)j ((,+;M(eval) r,(o(A --+ B),oA k oB). Assume f r,o(A + B) 
and er, oA. Then we have 
Vs’ E S . Va(s + s’ A (a r,t A) + f ‘a r,! B) 
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(3d.s; S’)Avavs’(sRe(a,s’) -+ar,rA). 
Let d = K 4; tfiA+, (cA)) 9 .M(eval). We must prove d rs oB. We have 
s&(b,s’) + 3a(sR,(a,s’) A b = f‘a) 
by Lemma 7.2 Therefore 
(3s’ . s t s’) A ‘dbVs’(s Rd(b, s’) -+ b rsf B). 
This shows that dr, o B. 
o-T. It is easy to see that n((A)) r(A t oA). 
o-4. We prove p(tA)) r(02A t oA). Suppose ar, o2 A. Then 
(3s’ .s ; S’) A kz’v.s’(sR,(a’,s’) + 
(3” . s’ C s”) A V&S”(S &(a”, s”) + Q” rp A)). 
holds. This implies 
(3u’~S’3a1’3S”(SR,(a’,s’) A S’R&“,S”)) 
A’da’Vs’Va”Ys”(s R,(a’, s’) A dR,~(a”,s”) + a” rp A). 
Hence, by Lemma 7.2, we have 
3s”.s 
(WqA))) 
F s” A Vu”Vs”(s Rc,;~,((,,, )(a”, s”) --+ a” r,j~ A). 
Therefore a; PL((~)) rs oA. 
Assume that er, o 1. Then s R, (e’,s’) and e’ E ‘3 (s’, I) for some e’ and s’. 
However, this is impossible, because 93 (s’, I) is empty. Therefore we never have 
er, o 1. Hence ?‘&,, : MO + ((A)) realizes 01 t- A. q 
7.4. Collapsing map as program extraction 
We show how to extract a metalanguage program from a proof. 
Definition 7.5. Consider a metalanguage term e with the typing judgment A k e : z. 
Let r t A be a propositional sequent. Then we define 
(d k e : z)rLJ(r k A) w [A t- e : & rJ (r t A) 
where [d F e : T]_$ is the interpretation of A I- e : t under I in the same strong monad 
as the one used to define r-‘. 
Note that if (d k e : z)rLJ(I’ I- A) then [A] = ((r)), and [z] = ((A))P necessarily 
hold. 
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N.B. In the above definition, we used Moggi’s semantics [A k e : T]L instead 
of our Y-strong monad semantics [A k e : ~h,~. In this subsection, we are trying 
to consider a program as the collapsed image of a proof. Since collapsing map col- 
lapses comonad-related strutures, it is natural not to use comonads here to interpret the 
program e. On the other hand, we will use an _5?-strong monad in the next subsection 
to interpret proofs. 
Theorem 7.6. Let T be a type theory based on TCS4, J be (p, r), and I be (0, y). 
Assume that 
1. for each basic type A of T, we have [AA-]% = ((Prop(A))),, and 
2. for any constant symbol c of T, 
(F c : typeof (c))-rLJ Prop(k c : typeof (c)) 
Then 
(r k e : A)-rIeJ Prop(T k e : A) 
holds whenever r t e : A is derivable in T. 
We prove this theorem in the next subsection using the categorical interpretation of 
TCS4, although it is not difficult to prove it directly. 
Program extraction: This theorem shows that we can extract a program from a 
proof using the collapsing map. First we write a program specification of the form 
ooA. It can be read as “It will always be true that there is a command which turns 
A (constructively) true”. or “Find a command which will always turn A true”. This 
formula corresponds to the type LMA’ by the mapping Type, where A’ means Type(A). 
Then we prove k e : LMA’ for some term e. When a proof of ooA is given, we can 
effectively find such e using Theorem 6.2; otherwise, we may work in the type theory 
from the outset. If such e is found, we can extract a program by collapsing e. By the 
last theorem, term e- meets the given specification. 
7.5. Understanding realizability by Y-strong monad 
We have not used the notion of Y-strong monad in the definition of the realizability 
interpretation. However, it does not mean that Z-strong monads are irrelevant to the 
study of the realizability interpretation; on the contrary, our realizability interpretation 
is nothing but a special case of categorical semantics based on the notion of Y-strong 
monads. 
Suppose that a generalized side-effect monad (8, (M, q, ,u, t),R) over S is given and 
a realizability interpretation rf” is defined. We define a category %? as follows: 
l An object X is a function from S to power set of 2 for some A E Obj(%). The 
object A is called the support of X, and written as suppX. Hence X(s) 5 supp X for 
each state s in S. We often write X for suppX. 
S. Kobayashil Theoretical Computer Science I75 (1997) 29-74 63 
l An arrow from X to Y is a %?-arrow f E U(suppX, supp Y) such that 
vs E s .v.x E X(s). ((x; f) E Y(s)). 
l Composition is just composition in 59. Therefore, the identity iax on X is the identity 
on suppX in the sense of $2’. 
Then e has a natural CS4 structure 9 = (3, (A?, 9, t’)) defined as follows: 
l Structure of ccc: 
_ Terminal object i is Is E S. {idl}, terminal arrow 1~ is !y. 
-ProductX~Y=~s~S.{(a,b)~(~xY)]a~X(s)Ab~Y(s)}. 
- Projections are given by I??’ = 78’ ’ and i$ ’ = rc‘!, ‘. 
- Product arrow (f,gj is just (f ,g)?n the sense of %?y 
- Exponential object X3Y is 
As E S . {f E G-7 1 vx E X(s). (f ‘x E Y(s))}. 
- /If : 2 --t (X3Y) (currying) is just /If : i + (2 * I’). 
- evTz1~~ : (X5-Y)XX + Y is evalf,g : (2 * Y) x 2 -+ Y. 
l Weak co-Cartesian structure: 
_ Weak initial 6 is As E S. 0, where 0 is considered as the null subset of 0. Weak 
initial arrow 7~ is ?x. 
- Weak coproduct XTY is Is E S. ({x; inZz,p 1 x E X(s)} U {y; inry,~ ] y E Y(s)}) 
- Injections are &ix,y = in12 f and i&x, y = inry p. 
- ” 
- Weak coproduct arrow [f, bj: XTY + Z is [f, g] : X t Y -+ 2. 
l The Cartesian comonad structure is defined by 
- L(X) is ils E S.{e E_TIVs’ E S.(s + s’ -+ e E X(s’))}. Note that suppi is 
the same as supp X. 
- Counit ,FX is the identity on 8. 
- Co-Kleisli lifting f’ off is just f itself. 
- Fi5, : i -+ Li: is idl. 
_ 6ix,y : &xtY -+ 2(X% Y) is the identity on A? x Y. 
l The monad structure is defined by 
- R(X) is Is E S. {e E m I(3 .s F s’) A Ve’Vs’(sR,(e’,s’) + e’ E X(s’))}. 
Note that supp(A?(X)) is M(suppX). 
- & is r/f. 
- Kleisli lifting f’ of f : X -+ tiY is just f * : M(2) -+ M(Y). 
l The p’-tensorial strength for ii? is given by tT:y = ty, y. 
42 
l The monad fnnctor ti preserves weak initials. ?X IS ??. 
It is not hard to verify that these definitions are well defined. 
Theorem 7.7. Let G(P) = Is E ,S.‘3$;,(s,P)(= As E S.r(s,P)) and 1~ = (9,116). 
1. For any e : 1 -+ ((A))p in %’ and s E S, we have 
(9) 
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e @‘A w e : 1 -3 [A]&& in 3. 
Hence A is realizable under (p,r) if and only if it is valid under I”u. 
2. For any f : V)), --f (@))p, 
fr,P”(r t A) H Vg E [&&). (9; f E I[Al&,(s)), 
f@‘(r 1 A) H f : [I$& -+ [A$& in 3. 
Hence, r k A is realizable under (p, r) if and only if it is valid under r”,. 
(10) 
Proof. (1) (9) is easily proved by induction on the complexity of A. (10) is clear 
from (9). 
(2) Immediate from (1). 0 
This result shows that our realizability interpretation is a special case of the cate- 
gorical interpretation of propositional theories in CS4 structures. 
7.5.1. Another proof of Theorem 7.4 
One can prove Theorem 7.4 using the last lemma. Suppose r k A. Then, by 
Theorem 6.6, r t A is valid under I”u, and hence realizable. 
7.5.2. Proof of Theorem 7.6 
Let g(B) = G(Prop(B)) for each basic type B, and let 6 = (9, 6). Then: 
Lemma 7.8. For each type A, we have [A&?,,, = [Prop(A)]& = 1s E S. 9$,,&, 
Prop(A )) and s~PP~[A&~, = NProp(A Np. 
Proof. By induction on the complexity of A. Easy. Cl 
Suppose that the assumptions of Theorem 7.6 are satisfied. Let y(c) = [(k c : 
typeof (c))-IL, and IT = (6, 7). Then: 
Lemma 7.9. [A-]$ = ((Prop(A))), for any type A. Hence, by Lemma 7.8, 
s~pflA&-~, = [A-]“,,. 
Proof. Straightforward induction on the complexity of A. 0 
Theorem 7.10. (1) If I’ k e : A, then [I- k e : A]&, rJ Prop(T k e : A). 
(2) ir k e : A]&, = i(r k e : A)-]:,. 
Proof. (1) By Lemma 7.8, [r]$c,,, = [Prop(r)&. Therefore or t- e : A]&, : 
[prop(&&, + Pop(41~4. Hence, by Theorem 7.7, [r k e : A]& rJ Prop(r k e : 
A). 
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(2) We prove by induction on the derivation of r t e : A. For readability, we write 
[Al- and [A] for [A]$&, and [Al”,, respectively. Similarly, we write gr k e : AIJ- and 
[A I- f : B]I for ([f k e : A&,, and [A !- f : l?]L, respectively. Consider the last rule 
applied. The cases of the rules for variables, products, coproducts and functions are 
easy. 
l The rule for constants: For a constant c of type A, 
I 
[r k c : A]-= !,q; f(c) 
= !Or-,;[(k c : A)-] (by Lemma 7.9) 
= [(r k c : A)-]. 
l The L.I rule: Let 
hi = [[r I- ei : LAi]-= [(r t- ei : LAi)-1, 
g = lx, : LA,, . . . ,x,, : LA,, t- f : B]- = [(x, : LA1,. . . ,;c, : LA, t f : B)-1. 
Then 
([r k (box f with el,. . .,e, for XI,. . .,x,) : LBi 
= (hl,...,hn); qq-,... q.q*; ((~,A,)-j,...,,A,l-)-l; dA 
= (hl,...,h,);g 
= UT- k [e;, . . . ,e;/xl,. . . ,x,]f- : B-j 
= [(r I- (box f with el,..., e, for x1 ,..., x,) : LB)-] 
l The L.E rule: 
[r k unbox e : A]-= [r t- e : LABI; $,- 
= [(r k e : LA)-]; i$-, (by I.H. and the definition of E”) 
= [(r k unbox e : A)-]. 
l The M.I rule: 
[r b [e] : MA]-= [f t e : A]*; $,- 
= [(r k e : A)-& qp-1 (by I.H. and the definition of $) 
= [(r k [e] : MA)-]. 
l The M.E rule: Suppose 
gi = [r k e : MA]-= [(r Fe : MA)-], 
hi = [r t e; : LAi]“= [(r t ei : LAi)-B, 
- - 
g2 = I& : LA,,x : A t f : MB]-= [(jz, : LA,,x : A I- f : MB)-]. 
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Then 
[r t- (let x + e in f with & for 2,) : MB] 
= K@lY.. .~~~)~;~[,,,-,...;,A,,~)‘91)“;~,,-x...i,~*l;,~1-; 
w$,,- ic . ..i(.,q-) -’ x id,A,-);g~)G 
= ((Al,..., h,),gl);t,~;,x...x,a,,,,~-,;g2* 
= (id,,-,,gl);t,r-,,,~A-,;M((hl,...,h,) x i+,);g; 
= (id,,-,,gl);t,,-,,,A-,;(((hl,...,h,) x +A-,);gd* 
= [r- t- let x + e- in [e,, . . . ,e;/xl,. . . ,xJf- : MB-] 
= [r k (let x + e in f with C,, for 2,) : MB-]. 
l The M0.E rule: 
[r k??(e) : A]“= [r I- e : MO]-; ?$,- 
= [(f F e : MO)-& ?$_, 
= [r l-??(e) : A-]. 
This completes the proof. 0 
Now we can prove Theorem 7.6 easily. Assume that r F e : A in T. Then, by the 
above theorem, [(r I- e : A)-J,$dProp(f k e : A) holds, and hence we have 
(r F e : A)-fiJProp(T I- e : A). 
8. A toy example of program extraction 
We shall present a toy example of program extraction, 
Let us consider the following problem: There is a room with an electric light with 
a toggle switch. A robot with a sensor eye is in the room. By reading the output of 
the sensor, he can know whether the room is light or dark. The task for the robot is 
to turn the light on. 
This problem is modeled as follows: Let S be the two-point set {light,dmk}. 
Consider the deterministic side-effect monad over Set with S as the set of states. We 
identify an element of A (in set-theoretical sense) and the corresponding global element 
in Hom(l,A). We write * for the unique element of 1. Define Boo1 E Obj(Set) by 
Bool = 1 + 1 = {inll,,(*),inrl,l(*)}. 
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We write true for id,,,(*) and false for inrl,l(*). We define sensor E MBool and 
toggle E Ml by 
sensor = {(light, (true, light)), (dark, (false, dark))}, 
toggle = {(light,(*,dark)),(dark,(*,light))}. 
Consider the two propositional variables Light and Dark. Let 
p(Light) = p(Dark) = 1 E Obj(Set), 
r(light, Light) = 1, r(a’ark, Light) = 0, 
r(light, Dark) = 0, r(dark, Dark) = 1. 
Consider the metalanguage with two constants ensor : MBool and toggle : Ml, 
where Boo1 = 1 + 1. We define 
if a then b else c = case a of inll,l(x) + bl(inrl,,(y) 
* c (x G FV(b),y @ WC)) 
skip = [*I. 
Define y(sensor) = sensor and y(toggle) = toggle. Then 
1 k sensor : MBool~#‘~‘oo (Light v Dark), 
I[ k Ix : l.toggle : 1 -+ MlhPo(Dark -+ alight), 
[ F Ax : l.toggle : 1 + MlJ&‘3ro(Light -+ oDark). 
Let 
U = CS4 + no (Light v Dark) + q (Dark --) alight) + @Light -+ oDark). 
Then, by Theorem 7.4, all provable formulas of U are realizable. For simplicity, we 
identify a propositional variable P and the corresponding basic type Type(P). FF(U) 
is TCS4(C) with C = {AxSensor,AxTogglel,AxToggle2}, where 
AxSensor : LM(Light + Dark), 
AxTogglel : L(Dark + MLight), 
AxToggle : L(Light --t MDark). 
Here we have written 
AxSensor for AxConst(oo (Light v Dark)), 
AxTogglel for AxConst(o(Dark + alight)), 
AxToggle for AxConst(o(Light + oDark)). 
68 S. Kobayashil Theoretical Computer Science I75 (1997) 29-74 
We define 
mltype(Light) = mZrype(Dark) = 1, 
mltem(AxSensor) = sensor, 
mlterm(AxToggle1) = mlterm(AxToggle2) = ;Ix : 1 .toggle. 
Then all the assumptions of Theorem 7.6 are satisfied. 
The specification of the program for the robot’s task is written as q o Light. It can 
be read as “It is always the case that there is a command which turns the light on”. 
or “Find a command which will always turn the light on”. This specification formula 
corresponds to the type LMLight by the mapping Type, We must find a term e and 
prove k e : LMLight in the type theory YY(U). Let 
e= box(let z + unbox AxSensor in case z of inll,l(u) 
+ [u]llinrl,l(u) + (unbox w)u with AxTogglel for w). 
Then the reader can easily verify that I- e : LMLight is derivable in YY(U). Let us 
calculate the collapsing of e: 
e- = let z -+ sensor in case z of inll,l(u) * [u]llinrl,l(u) * (1x : l.toggle)u 
= let z -e sensor in case z of inll,l(u) * [*]llinrl,l(u) * toggle 
(by 1.q and -+ .p) 
= let z + sensor in if z then skip else toggle. 
This is the extracted program that meets the specification. 
9. Conclusion and future work 
We can consider two kinds of type systems: one can be viewed as a natural logic, 
and the other cannot be. Moggi’s type system is of the latter kind. It cannot be a 
natural modal logic. If we want to make it natural, we must make some modifications 
and add comonad types to it. In this way, we obtain the ty-pe system TCS4 that encodes 
the constructive version of S4 modal logic. 
It is usually said that a constructive proof is a program. However, exactly speaking, 
we should say that a constructive proof consists of a program and its correctness proof. 
The correctness part is not necessary at runtime. The realizability interpretation cuts off 
the correctness part (to some extent) and extracts the program part. When we describe 
the specification of a program or prove a certain theorem in modal logic, we need 
the o-modality in general, because q is needed for correctness proofs. However, the 
comonad types that model o-modality are not necessarily needed in the type system 
for the extracted programs, because “the correctness part” is no longer needed. 
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We meet a similar situation when considering dependent types. Constructive type 
systems designed for proof development usually have dependent products ZIx.A(x) 
and dependent sums C x .A@) for encoding of quantification. However, we can “col- 
lapse” these types to ordinary function types and ordinary product types when we are 
extracting programs from proofs. Dependent types are not necessarily needed in type 
systems for runtime programs. We think that a comonad type LA is collapsed to A 
for the same reason. The collapsing map collapses the comonad-related structures of a 
term and extracts a program. 
Our toy example is Section 8 is the simplest one for illustration of program extrac- 
tion. For more complex problems such as in-place sorting of an array, we will need 
a predicate modal logic. The author thinks that extending our result to the predicate 
logic version of CS4 is not difficult. However, it will need much effort to develop a 
method to extract efficient programs. It will be our future work. 
Our logic has only two modal operators q and o. Therefore, it is restricted in expres- 
siveness. To increase the expressive power of our logic, the author is now studying a 
type theory with evaluation modalities. For details of evaluation modalities, see Pitt’s 
[91 paper. 
10. Related works 
Bierman and de Paiva [l] studied a constructive S4 logic without o modality. They 
proposed Hilbert style, sequent calculus, and natural deduction formulations of their 
logic and gave a term-assignment system. Our type theory TCS4 is a natural extension 
of their term-assignment system. They also gave a categorical semantics of their logic 
using monoidal comonads. They did not use monads, because their logic did not have 
o-modality. Our semantics for CS4 is an extension of their semantics except that we 
used Cartesian comonads while they used monoidal ones. Every Cartesian comonad is 
of course monoidal, but the converse is not true. The reason why they did not need 
Cartesian comonads is that they did not consider q-equalities for box-expressions. 
Wijesekera [13] studied a constructive version of K modal logic, which is a subsys- 
tem of CS4. He gave a Kripke semantics for his logic and proved its soundness and 
completeness. He also proved that his system enjoys cut elimination. 
Brookes and Geva [2] introduced the notion of a computational comonad and used 
it to model intensional aspects of computations. Our Y-strong monad semantics of 
the metalanguage can be seen as a unification of their semantics and Moggi’s one. 
However, computational comonads cannot model any meaningful n-modality, because 
every computational comonad must have a natural transformation y : Id, -+ L and 
hence validates A f-f DA. 
In [8], a function from A to B possibly invoking continuations is interpreted as a 
proof of a linear logic formula of the form !A - o?!B. Recall that our new semantics of 
the metalanguage interprets a function from A to MB as a morphism from L[AA] to ML[Bj. 
The reader will find the similarity between !A - o?!B and LA -+ MLB. Nishizaki’s work 
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and ours are probably related, although the exact relationship between them has not 
been studied yet. 
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Appendix. Proof of Proposition 6.8 
We abbreviate x : A t el =B e2 as el = ez when the omitted parts are not significant. 
First we prove the following lemma: 
Lemma A.l. We have the following equalities: 
1. box f with &,g,g,d;, for X,,zl,z2,Jm = box [z,z/z~,zz]~ with &,,g,&,, for X,, 
z, J, (box-contraction). 
2. box f with &,gl,g2,d;n for &,z1,z2,jm = box f with &,gp,gl,& for X,,z2,21, 
J, (box-exchange). 
3. box f with C,, for X, = box f with C,,,d for X,,y (if y is not free in f), 
(box-weakening). 
4. let x -+ e in f with Z,,,d,d,& for Xn,z1,z2,jjm = let x -+ e in [z,z/zl,z2]f 
with E,,,d,d;, for Z,,,z,J, (let-contraction). 
5. let x + e in f with &,gl,gz,& forX,,zI,z2,Ym = let x -+ e in f with L;,,gz,gl, 
&, for nn,z2,zl,Jm (let-exchange). 
6. let x + e in f with Z,, for in = let x X= e in f with &d for X,,y (if y is not 
free in f ), (let-weakening). 
Proof. We prove (l),(2),(3) and (5). The other equalities are left to the reader. 
(1) 
box f with t?,,,g,g,&,, for Xn,z1,z2,jm 
= box (unbox (box f with %,,z,z,y, for X,,ZI,Z~,~,,,)) with Z~,,g,&,, 
for %,z, j, (by Q) 
= box [z,z/z~,zz]~ with Z,,,g,d;, for &,z,F, (by L./?) 
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(2) 
box f with &,,gl,gz,&, for X,,,z1,z2,jm 
= box (unbox (box f with %,,z2,z1,Ym for %,zz,z~,Y,,,)) 
with G,gl,g2,& for %,zIAY~ (by L.P) 
= box f with Z,,,g2,gl,&,, for Lz2,z1,Ym (by L.rl) 
(3) 
box f with & for X, 
= box (unbox (box f with X, for Z,,)) with &,d for &,Y (by L.q-) 
= box f with C,,,d for &, y (by L./?) 
(5) We let 
hi = box ni(unbox W) with z for w (for i = 1,2), 
h = box (unbox ~1, unbox 242) with zl,zz for 241,242, 
h’= box (unbox ul, unbox 242) with z2,z1 for u2,uI, 
g = [~l,h2/zlJ2lf. 
Then we have h = h’, [h/z]hi = zi(i = 1,2), and f = [h/z]g = [h’/z]g. Hence, 
let x + e in f with &,gl,gz,d;, for X,,z1,z2,Fm 
= let x + e in [h/z]g with &,gl,g2,& for X,,,Z~,ZZ,~, 
= let n + e in g with Z~,[gl,g2/z~,z$z,(?m for X,,z,j, 
(by let.box.comm.(n + 1)) 
= let x + e in g with ~~,[gl,g2/zl,z2]h’,(?m for X,,,z,j, 
= let x e e in [h’/z]g with C,,,g2,gl,& for ~n,~l,~~,~, 
(by let.box.comm.(n + 1)) 
= let x + e in f with C,,g2,gl,d;, for X,,z2,zl,j,,, q 
Using the above lemma, we prove that Y is a CS4 structure. We shall prove only 
that (i) ml is an isomorphism; (ii) mA,B iS an isomorphism, and (iii) (id,u X PB); t& = 
&&#(ti,B); p u4xB. Venfication of the other conditions are left to the reader. 
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(i) It is sufficient o show x : Ll k box * = L1 x: 
box * = box * with x for z (by box.weakening) 
= box (unbox z) with x for z (by 1.~) 
= LGlz (by L . ~1) 
= x. 
(ii) First we prove mA,,A1;L(xi) = xi. 
bOXni (unbox x) with 
(box (unbox yl, unbox yz) with TC~(X),Q(X) for y1,y2) for x 
= box ([box (unbox yl,unbox yz) with zl,z2 for y1,y&]Qunbox x)) 
with TT~(x),~T~(x) for z1,z2 (by box.ass.1) 
= box (ni(unbox (box (unbox yl,unbox ~2) with zl,z2 for yl,y2))) 
with ~-Q(x),Tc~(x) for z1,z2 
= box (ni(unbox zl,unbox ~2)) with ~TI(x),~Q(x) for zl,z2 (by L.fi) 
= box (unbox zi) with ~z~(x),~c~(x) for z1,z2 (by x.@ 
= xi(x) (by L. q). 
Hence mAI,A2; (L(~lhL(~2)) = i&(A,)xL(A& 
Next we verify (L(i'h hL(712)); ~A,,A~ = idL(A,xA2). 
box (unbox y~,unbox ~2) with ~l((sl(x),g2(x))),712((g1(x),g2(x))) for YI,YZ 
= box (unbox yl,unbox y2) with g1(x),g2(x) for yl,y2 
= box ([sl(z1),g2(z2)lY1,y21(unbox yl,unbox ~2)) with x,x for ZI,ZZ 
(by box.ass.1 and box.ass.2) 
= box ((unbox gl(zl),unbox g2(z2))) with x,x for z1,z2 
= box ((unbox gl(z), unbox 92(z))) with x for z (by bOx.contraction) 
= box (nl(unbox z),7c2(unbox z)) with x for z (by L./I) 
= box (unbox z) with x for z (by x. q) 
=x V-v L.rl) 
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(iii) We must prove (x : LA x M2B k el = M(LAxB)e2), where 
el =(let w -+ (let y -+ Q(X) in y) in [(u,w)] with xl(x) for u), 
e2 = (let Y += (let z -+ (let y -+ 712(x) in [(o,y)l with XI(X) for u) 
in [let w -+ 712(z) in [(u,w)] with m(z) for ul) in r). 
By the let.ass rule, 
el =let y-+x2(x) in (let w+y in [(u,~)] with u for u) with YC,(X) for v. 
Further, 
e2 = let r + (let y * 712(x) in (let z + [(u,y)l in [let w -+ 712(z) in [(u,w)l 
with ~~(2) for u]) with n,(x) for u) in Y (by let.ass) 
= let r -+ (let y + Q(X) in [let w + y in [(u,w)] with u for u] 
with T-C,(X) for v) in r (by A4.B and x. 8) 
= let y + x2(x) in (let r + [let w --+ y in [(u,w)] with v for u] in T-) 
with TC~(X) for u (by let.ass) 
= let y + x2(x) in (let w --+ y in [(u,w)] with v for u) with q(x) 
for u (by A4.p). 
Therefore, el = e2. 0 
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